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Abstract
This paper considers a sequential screening problem. A seller sells an object
to a buyer who is privately informed about the objects value. The value has two
components. The buyer knows the rst component when he contracts with the
seller and learns the second component only later. The optimal contract when
there is no commitment problem is a sequential mechanism in form of a menu of
fee-price pairs. Paying the initial fee gives the buyer the right to purchase the
good later at the corresponding price. High initial buyer types pay a high fee for
a low price later. Each buyer chooses a di¤erent fee-price pair. If commitment
is not feasible, the structure of the optimal contract is simpler. The optimal
contract is either no contract, a simple forcing contract, or a contract in which
high types buy for sure and low types pay an initial fee to buy the good at a
price later. The di¤erence to the setting with commitment is that all low buyer
types obtain the same fee-price pair and all high buyer types buy for sure. There
is no ne-tuning to specic buyer types. This might explain some simple real life
sales agreements and why rms might nd it optimal to group consumers into
specic customer groups.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies a seller-buyer problem in which the buyer acquires private infor-
mation over time. Specically, we consider a sellers attempt to sell a good to a buyer
with private information about his valuation for the good. This valuation has two com-
ponents: One that the buyer knows at the time of initial contracting with the seller,
and one that he observes only at a later point in time. Therefore, the buyer-seller rela-
tionship involves a sequential screening problem. We characterize the optimal contract
under two di¤erent contracting environments: full-commitment and renegotiation.
As a benchmark, consider rst the full-commitment case, in which the seller can
commit not to renegotiate any of the contractual terms once the initial contract has
been signed. The seller will optimally set up a sequential mechanism taking the form
a menu of fee-price pairs. Each of these pairs is a di¤erent call option: By choosing
a particular pair, the buyer pays the fee and gets the right to buy the good at the
specied (strike) price later, once he has observed the second component of his valua-
tion. Obviously, higher fees correspond to lower strike prices. The optimal mechanism
discriminates between all buyer types: In equilibrium, buyers with di¤erent initial val-
uations (i.e. rst components) select di¤erent fee-price pairs. Also, buyers with higher
initial valuations choose higher-fee/lower-price pairs. Sequential price discrimination
of this form is common practice in a variety of contexts including delity cards, book
clubs or plane tickets.
Consider next the renegotiation case, in which after the initial contract is signed,
the seller can make a new o¤er after the agent has observed his valuations second com-
ponent. Because no further information arrives, the revised o¤er is nal and optimally
takes the form of a single take-it-or-leave-it price o¤er.
The inability to commit to renegotiate the initial contract is a binding constraint
on the buyer-seller relationship. Indeed, as is well known, a contract designed opti-
mally to elicit hidden information usually becomes sub-optimal once this information
is revealed. The uninformed party (here the seller) will therefore try to renegotiate the
initial contract. This is anticipated by the informed party, making satisfying incentive
compatibility more di¢ cult. This so-called ratchet e¤ect has been studied in a variety
of circumstances.
We characterize the optimal contract under the simplifying assumption that the
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initial contract allocates the good non-stochastically. In this context, the optimal
contract has a surprisingly simple structure and can take one of three possible simple
forms. First, the seller might decide not to o¤er an initial contract at all and simply
wait until the agent has observed the second component to make him a take-it-or-leave
it price o¤er. Second, he might write a forcing contract in which he sells the good to
every buyer type for the same xed price. Finally, he might o¤er the buyer the choice
between only two options: Buying the good immediately for a set price, or buying a
call option. The options strike price must be renegotiation-proof, i.e., optimal once
the seller has received all the relevant reports from the buyer. Importantly, there is
only one call option, not a whole menu as in the full-commitment case. In equilibrium,
buyers divide into two groups: Those whose initial valuation is high enough simply
buy the good, while all others buy the (same) call option.
Note that, as in the full-commitment case, the third type of contract involves call
options. However, it implements much less ne-tuning to specic buyer types. Indeed,
all low initial valuation buyers get the same call option and all high initial valuation
buyers buy the good for sure. The coarseness of the optimal contract might explain the
simplicity of some real life sales agreements and why rms often group consumers into
specic customer categories rather than treat each customer on an individual basis.
The literature on screening with sequentially released information is small. It in-
cludes Courty and Li (2000) in static contracting environments, and Baron and Besanko
(1984), in dynamic environments. These papers study the full-commitment case and
make use of the Revelation Principle. Blume (1998), extending Hart and Tirole (1988),
studies a buyer-seller relationship with time varying valuations and contract renego-
tiation. The author retains a persistent component for the buyers valuation and in
addition introduces a transient component. By assumption the seller does not want to
screen this transient component. This is in contrast to the model in this paper, where
the seller always has an incentive to ex-post screen the total valuation of the buyer.
Kraehmer and Strausz (2007) contains a similar set-up as this paper but the buyer
has to invest into acquiring information about the second component of his valuation.
There is also no commitment problem.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 and 4
characterize the optimal contract under full commitment and renegotiation respectively.
The last section concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
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2 The Model
A seller considers selling one unit of a good to a potential buyer. The buyer has a
total valuation v for the good, which is made up of two components v1 and v2. For
simplicity we assume an additive structure: v = v1 + v2.1 The two variables v1 and
v2 are both private information to the buyer and can be thought of as two di¤erent
realizations of uncertainty or aspects of the state of nature that both inuence the
buyers enjoyment of the good. Importantly, v1 is realized at some point in time before
v2. We call v1 the buyers rst stage type and v2 his second stage type. His nal type is
v. We assume that both variables v1 and v2 are drawn independently on the intervals
[vi; vi] according to two commonly known cumulative distribution functions Fi() with
strictly positive densities fi(), i = 1; 2. In addition, we assume that both distributions
satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property. The distributions on the vis induce a
probability distribution of the nal value v on the interval [v1+ v2; v1+ v2], which can
be written as
F (v) :=
Z v v2
v1
Z v v1
v2
dF2(v2) dF1(v1): (1)
The sellers production costs are xed and normalized to 0. We assume that v1+v2  0,
which implies that the Pareto optimal solution involves selling to all nal buyer types.
The seller makes all contracting o¤ers.
3 The Benchmark: Full Commitment
Consider rst the set-up with full commitment. The revelation principle allows us
to reduce the sellers problem to nding a two-stage direct revelation mechanism, in
which the buyer announces v1 at stage 1 and v2 at stage 2. Conditional on his two
announcements he receives the good with probability (v1; v2) 2 f0; 1g2 and pays
a price p(v1; v2). Price and probability of trade are chosen to maximize the sellers
1To extend the analysis to a framework in which the valuation is a more general function of two
consecutively realized states of nature is beyond the scope of this paper. It might be interesting
material for future research.
2In general, we would like to allow for  2 [0; 1]. For the benchmark case with commitment the
assumption that  2 f0; 1g makes no di¤erence because the optimal solution has either  = 0 or  = 1:
For the case with renegotiation it constitutes a real constraint but it allows us to greatly simplify the
analysis.
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expected surplus subject to the constraint that the buyer tells the truth about both v1
and v2, and that, conditional on v1, he receives a payo¤ of at least 0 in expectation.
The timing is as follows:
v1 realized
date 0
stage 1
8<: S proposes contractB reveals v1
date 1
v2 realized
date 1.5
stage 2
8<: B reveals v2contract is enforced
date 2
For future reference, consider what happens if no contract is signed at date 1 and
the seller tries selling his product only at date 2. At that date he faces a continuum
of buyer types v distributed on [v1 + v2; v1 + v2]. Using a standard argument one can
show that he optimally picks a price q to
max
q
q(1  F (q)); (2)
where F (q) is given by (1). Call the solution to this problem v and assume that v is
unique.
Let us now turn to the full problem. It turns out that the following relatively simple
contract implements the optimal direct revelation mechanism: At date 1, the buyer
pays an initial fee that is dependent on his type v1, call it A(v1). This gives him the
right to purchase the good at date 2 for a price p(v1). Obviously, he will only exercise
this option if his nal valuation v1 + v2 lies above the price p(v1).
Proposition 1 With full commitment the seller o¤ers a menu of contracts fA(v1); p(v1)g;
v1 2 [v1; v1]. The buyer selects a pair (A(v1); p(v1)) at date 1 and pays A(v1). At date
2 he decides whether or not to buy the good at the price p(v1).
The sellers optimization problem is formalized below. For this we need the following
notation. Set U(v1; v2) = (v1; v2)(v1 + v2)   p(v1; v2). This is the utility of a nal
v1 + v2-type buyer who announces both v1 and v2 truthfully at the relevant screening
stages. In what follows it will be also useful to consider two other levels of utility. The
rst, U(v1; v2; v^1) = (v^1; v^2)(v1 + v2)   p(v^1; v^2), is the utility of a nal v1 + v2-type
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buyer who announces v^1 at the rst revelation stage and v^2 at the second stage, where
v^2 is given by
v^2(v1; v2; v^1) = argmax
x
(v^1; x)(v1 + v2)  p(v^1; x): (3)
The second, U(v1; v2; v^2) = (v1; v^2)(v1+ v2)  p(v1; v^2), is the utility of a nal v1+ v2-
type buyer who announces v1 truthfully at the rst stage and then chooses some an-
nouncement v^2 at the second revelation stage. Finally, U(v1; v^1) :=
R v2
v2
U(v1; v2; v^1) dF2(v2)
is the expected utility of an initial v1-type buyer who announces v^1 and then chooses
his second announcement according to 3. Set U(v1) := U(v1; v1).
With these notations in place, the sellers program can be written as
max
;U
Z v1
v1
Z v2
v2
[(v1; v2)(v1 + v2)  U(v1; v2)] dF2(v2) dF1(v1) (4)
s.t.
(IC2) U(v1; v2)  U(v1; v2; v^2); 8 v1; v2; v^2 (5)
(IC1)
Z v2
v2
U(v1; v2) dF2(v2)  U(v1; v^1); 8 v1; v^1 (6)
(IR)
Z v2
v2
U(v1; v2) dF2(v2)  0 8 v1 (7)
Line (5) formalizes the incentive constraint at the nal screening stage. Given that
v1 is revealed truthfully at the rst screening stage (IC2) ensures that v2 is also revealed
truthfully. Line (6) contains the incentive constraint at the initial screening stage. The
left-hand side is a v1-type buyers expected utility when he announces both his types
truthfully in the two consecutive revelation stages. The right-hand side is his expected
utility when he announces some other type v^1 in the rst stage and then chooses his
second stage announcement v^2 according to (3). Line (7) formalizes a v1-type buyers
individual rationality constraint. He must receive at least his reservation utility in
expectation if he tells the truth in both stages.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the appendix. It uses some variations of
the techniques developed by Mirlees (1971) to replace both (IC1) and (IC2) with the
relevant local rst-order and monotonicity conditions. The solution to this contracting
problem has some interesting features. It is optimal for the seller to trade with all
types v, such that
v  1  F1(v)
f1(v)
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First, remark that the solution is bang-bang although there is some non-linearity
introduced through the expectation operator in the incentive constraint (ICI). The
solution is similar to a static problem in which the good is sold if and only if v  1 F (v)
f(v)
:
In the sequential model total valuation must lie above 1 F1(v1)
f1(v1)
, the hazard rate of the
rst variables distribution function, because only the rst variable is known when the
contract o¤er is made. Also, the allocation depends on the realization of the second
variable but the price at which the good is sold only depends on the rst variable. This
is in contrast to what happens without commitment as will be seen in the next section.
The model is a special case of Courty and Li (2000), a version of which they discuss
as an example. The authors study general sequential screening problems with com-
mitment when the buyer has some private information with respect to the distribution
of his total valuation. Here, he has no better information about the distribution but
he knows the support. In Courty and Li (2000) the support is xed and therefore a
slightly di¤erent proof must be employed.
4 Sequential Screening with No Commitment
We now consider the situation in which the seller is not committed by his date 1 contract
and can instead try and renegotiate the contractual terms with the buyer once new
information has arrived, that is, once v2 is realized. Renegotiation could in principle
happen anytime at or after date 2. The implicit assumption here is, that although a
long-term commitment (i.e. from date 1 to date 2) is not possible for the seller, he can
commit in the short-term: A contract that is signed and enforced within the same time
period is binding. Due to the Revelation Principle, a new contract o¤er can without loss
of generality be taken to be a direct mechanism, in which the buyer truthfully reveals
his nal type. This is not so with the date 1 contract. The Revelation Principle breaks
down due to the lack of commitment and it is not immediately obvious what type of
contract is optimal at that date. Nevertheless, a version of the Revelation Principle
that is due to Bester and Strausz (2000) applies in this setting. Their paper shows that
in a private information setting with a single agent (buyer) and direct communication
(no transmission/garbling devices) any mechanism without commitment can without
loss of generality be taken to be a direct revelation mechanism in which the agent sends
messages about his type to the principle (seller). He does not necessarily tell the truth:
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he can mix between announcements. So, in our setting we take a date 1 contract to
be composed of two stages. It is described by two message spaces M1 and M23 with
typical elements m1 and m2, and for each message pair (m1;m2) a probability of trade
(m1;m2) and a price p(m1;m2). Message m1 is sent by the buyer after the contract
o¤er at stage 1, message m2 is sent by him at stage 2 after he has learnt v2. To simplify
notation, we write M :=M1 M2.
There are two points in time at which renegotiation could enter into this setting,
namely, either before or after the prescriptions of the date 1 contract have been carried
out. To distinguish the two possible timings we will call the former interim renegoti-
ation and the latter ex-post renegotiation. Since the date 1 contract has its own time
line (stage 1, stage 2) interim renegotiation can also happen at di¤erent points in time.
More precisely, the seller could o¤er a new contract before stage 2, that is, before the
buyer sends message m2, or after stage 2 but before the contract is enforced. Whether
one or the other timing is more reasonable and whether they deliver di¤erent results
is not clear. To cut through this complication and to gain a rst insight into what
happens with renegotiation in a sequential setting, we concentrate instead on ex-post
renegotiation. Ex-post renegotiation happens right at the end of contract 1, when all
the prescriptions of the contract have been carried out. At that point, the seller either
faces a buyer who has already bought the object and, since this is the e¢ cient outcome,
there is no more to renegotiate. Alternatively, he faces a buyer who has not bought the
object and so the seller makes him a nal o¤er. This o¤er is just a take-it-or-leave-it
o¤er with a new price, which we call the renegotiation price. Of course, this new price
depends on the information the buyer has revealed during the date 1 contract.
Note, that the di¤erent types of renegotiation imply slightly di¤erent assumptions
on the partiescommitment abilities. With interim renegotiation, there is little com-
mitment between the dates. A date 1 contract can be written but there is no guarantee
that its prescriptions will be carried out. With ex-post renegotiation, there is commit-
ment to the terms of the original contract in the sense that it will be carried out and
enforced by a court. But a court cannot prevent the seller to reopen trade in case the
original contract led to an ine¢ cient outcome.
3In principle, the second message space could depend on the rst message and should be denoted
by M2(m1). To simplify notation we suppress this dependency and simply write M2. As it turns out
the optimal solution does not make use of this possibility.
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We concentrate on ex-post renegotiation although this is not how renegotiation
is commonly modelled in the literature. Nevertheless, we believe that it provides
interesting results in its own right, and that it constitutes an important rst step in
analyzing renegotiation in a sequential setting. Future research should be carried out
on interim renegotiation and on how the two renegotiation regimes compare. Finally,
this can lead to a discussion about the timing of renegotiation and how di¤erent limits
to commitment a¤ect welfare.
4.1 Ex-Post Renegotiation
With ex-post renegotiation the time line is as follows:
v1 realized
date 0
stage 1
8<: S proposes contractB sends m1
date 1
v2 realized
date 1.5
stage 2
8<: B sends m2contract is enforced
date 2 date 3
renegotiation
The overall game consists of the contract o¤er at date 1, which determines the
message games played at stages 1 and 2, and the nal renegotiation o¤er at date 3.
The solution concept is that of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
The sellers strategy in the game is as follows. First, he designs the date 1 contract.
That is, he chooses the two message spaces M1 and M2 and the probability of trade
(m1;m2) and the price p(m1;m2). Second, the seller sets a renegotiation price at date
3. This is denoted by q(m1;m2). It is dependent on the message pair (m1;m2) because
the seller updates his belief about the buyers type after receiving the two messages.
The buyers strategy in the game consists of a pair of probability distributions
(1; 2), 1 is a probability distribution over message spaceM1, and 2 is a probability
distribution over message space M2. More precisely, 1(m1 j v1) is the probability
with which a v1-type buyer sends message m1 at stage 1, and 2(m2 j v1; v2;m1) is
the probability with which a v1 + v2-type buyer who has sent message m1 at stage 1
sends message m2 at stage 2: There is no need to explicitly account for the buyers
acceptance decision of the date 1 contract, because this is done via the individual
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rationality constraint in the sellers optimization problem. Neither do we need to
model the buyers acceptance decision of the renegotiation price at date 3: He accepts
any price o¤er q that is lower than his nal valuation.
It is convenient to write the problem as in section 3. We dene the utility that a nal
v-type buyer receives under the date 1 contract, that is, before the nal renegotiation
o¤er as:
U(m1;m2; v) := (m1;m2)v   p(m1;m2):
We now turn to the analysis of this game. As stated above, at date 3 the seller o¤ers a
renegotiation price q(m1;m2) that maximizes q(1 F (q j m1;m2)), where F ( j m1;m2)
is the sellers updated belief about the buyers nal type after having received the
message pair (m1;m2), arrived at via Bayes Rule. A buyer type v accepts this o¤er if
and only if v  q(m1;m2). We now analyze the message sending stages.
4.2 Message Sending Stages
Fix a contract [M1;M2; (; ); p(; )] with induced renegotiation price q(; ). The rst
lemma states that, if the sellers belief (i.e. his renegotiation o¤er) is independent
of the buyers messages then the contract itself cannot be made dependent on those
messages.
Lemma 1 Assume that q(m1;m2)  q 8(m1;m2). Then, q = v, where v is the
solution to (2), and for almost all message pairs (m1;m2), the contract has (m1;m2) 
 and p(m1;m2) = p:
It remains to investigate the situation in which the seller, depending on the buyers
messages, sets di¤erent prices at the renegotiation stage. For this we proceed in two
steps. We rst investigate how the contract depends on the message at stage 2 and
then on how it depends on the message at stage 1. For this, x the rst message m1.
The next Lemma shows that even if the second stage message a¤ects the sellers belief
and his nal renegotiation o¤er, the contract depends in only a very limited way on
the second message.
Lemma 2 For a xed m1, assume that the seller sets di¤erent renegotiation prices
fq1; q2; :::g depending on the buyers message at stage 2. Without a¤ecting nal payo¤s,
the contract can be assumed to contain only two messages at stage 2, m2 and m^2, with
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q(m1;m2) = q := min qi and q(m1; m^2) = q^ := minqi 6=q qi. Also, (m1;m2)  1,
(m1; m^2) = 1, and p(m1; m^2) = p(m1;m2) + (1   (m1;m2))q. Final buyer types
v  q send both messages m2 and m^2 and obtain a level of ex-post utility equal to
U(m1; v) = v   p(m1; m^2). Final buyer types v < q only send message m2 and obtain
a level of ex-post utility equal to U(m1; v) = (m1;m2)v   p(m1;m2).
Lemma 2 allows us to simplify the prescriptions of the contract. Set  := (m1;m2)
and p := p(m1;m2). Then, Lemma 2 tells us that the buyer sends a message m1 2M1
at stage 1 and either message m2 or message m^2 at stage 2. If he sends message m^2
he obtains the good under the date 1 contract for a price p + (1   )q. If he sends
message m2 he obtains the good with probability  at the price p. After message m^2
there is nothing more to renegotiate, after messagem2, if the good is not sold under the
contract the seller o¤ers to sell it at q. Thus, all nal buyer types above q (independent
of the message they send) obtain v  p  (1  )q and nal buyer types below q obtain
v   p.
We now turn to the incentive constraints imposed by the rst message sending stage.
For this, it is convenient to derive expressions for a rst stage buyer types expected
utility from sending message m1. Following the above result and maintaining the same
notation, a rst stage buyer type v1 expects the following payo¤ from a message m1:
U(m1; v1) =
Z q v1
v2
(v1 + v2)  p dF2(v2) +
Z v2
q v1
v1 + v2   p  (1  )q dF2(v2)
= v1 + E[v2]  p  (1  )
Z v2
v2
min(v1 + v2; q) dF2(v2)
: = v1 + E[v2]  p  (1  )(v1; q):
Note, that (v1; q) is positive and strictly increasing in v1 and q. The next Lemma
details how the contract can depend on the rst message. To simplify, we rst assume
that there are only two possible rst stage messages.
Lemma 3 Take two di¤erent rst stage messages m1 and m01 with q < q
0. Then, the
date 1 contract can have two possible forms. Either  = 0 = 1 and p = p0, that is, the
contract is a simple forcing contract. Alternatively, the buyers equilibrium strategy at
the rst message sending must be a partition equilibrium strategy, that is, there exists
a rst stage buyer type vlim1 , such that all rst stage buyer types in V := [v1; v
lim
1 ] send
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message m1 and all rst stage buyer types in V 0 := [vlim1 ; v1] send message m
0
1. In this
case, the additional constraints on the contract are
p0   p = (1  )(vlim1 ; q)  (1  0)(vlim1 ; q0) (8)
(1  )
Z q v1
q v01
F2(v2) dv2  (1  0)
Z q0 v1
q0 v01
F2(v2) dv2: 8v1 2 V , v01 2 V 0 (9)
The incentive constraint in (9) implies that we only need to consider two possible
solution pairs: (; 0) = (0; 1) and (; 0) = (1; 1).
5 Contract O¤er Stage
Last, we need to compute the contract that maximizes the sellers expected payo¤.
We rst consider the constraints imposed on a contract if the renegotiation o¤er does
not vary with the buyers messages. Then, Lemma 1 tells us that independent of the
buyers messages the contract prescribes a probability of trade  and the buyer pays a
price p. The sellers expected revenue is
p+ (1  )(1  F (v))v;
he obtains the price p and the expected renegotiation revenue (1 F (v))v if the good
is not sold under the date 1 contract.
To maximize this revenue, the lowest rst stage buyer type is kept at his reservation
utility. The reservation utility of a type v1 buyer is the expected payo¤he receives from
no contract at date 1 followed by the sellers nal o¤er at date 3, which consists of the
take-it-or-leave-it price o¤er v. Formally, it is
R(v1; v
) =
Z v2
v v1
v1 + v2   v dF2(v2):
Then, the lowest rst stage buyer types binding participation constraint can be written
as
(v1 + E[v2])  p+ (1  )R(v1; v) = R(v1; v).
Substituting for p in the sellers objective function we obtain
(v1; v
) + (1  )(1  F (v))v:
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The rst part of this expression is the price that he receives under a contract, the
second part is the expected price he receives at renegotiation. The optimal contract in
this case is either a forcing contract ( = 1, p = (v1; v
)) or no contract ( = p = 0).
The latter generates a revenue of (1  F (v))v.
Now, let us consider a contract as detailed in Lemma 2.
The sellers objective function isZ vlim1
v1

p+ (1  )
Z v2
q v1
q dF2(v2)

dF1(v1) (10)
+
Z v1
vlim1

p0 + (1  0)
Z v2
q0 v1
q0 dF2(v2)

dF1(v1):
The rst part of (10) is the expected payment he receives from rst stage buyer types
below vlim1 . They send messagem1 and pay a price p under the contract. With probabil-
ity 1  trade does not occur before the nal o¤er and all nal buyer types v1+v2 > q
accept the renegotiation o¤er q. The second part of (10) is the expected payment that
the seller receives from rst stage buyer types above vlim1 . Using (8) we can replace p
0
in (10):
p+ [(1  )(vlim1 ; q)  (1  0)(vlim1 ; q0)](1  F1(vlim1 ))
+(1  )
Z vlim1
v1
Z v2
q v1
q dF2(v2) dF1(v1) + (1  0)
Z v1
vlim1
Z v2
q0 v1
q0 dF2(v2) dF1(v1):
From the lowest rst stage buyer types binding participation constraint we obtain
v1 + E[v2]  p  (1  )(v1; q) = R(v1v)
and substituting for p in the sellers objective function we derive the following linear
expression in 1   and 1  0
(v1; v
)
+(1  )
 
(vlim1 ; q)(1  F1(vlim1 ))  (v1; q) +
Z vlim1
v1
Z v2
q v1
q dF2(v2) dF1(v1)
!
+(1  0)
 
 (vlim1 ; q0)(1  F1(vlim1 )) +
Z v1
vlim1
Z v2
q0 v1
q0 dF2(v2) dF1(v1)
!
If the solution is (; 0) = (1; 1) the contract is a forcing contract as discussed
above.
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If the solution is (; 0) = (0; 1), this expression reduces to
(v1; v
)  (v1; q) +
Z v1
vlim1
(vlim1 ; q) dF1(v1) +
Z vlim1
v1
Z v2
q v1
q dF2(v2) dF1(v1) (11)
Here, one can see two possible benets of contracting for the seller. Because the
contract allows the seller to credibly commit to a lower nal price o¤er q after message
m1, he can ex-ante extract the possibly positive rent (v1; v
) (v1; q) that the lowest
rst stage buyer type obtains from this decrease. Next, a contract might ensure trade
with some high rst stage buyer types who would not have traded for sure without a
contract. First stage buyer types above vlim1 pay a lower price than without a contract
because min(v^1 + v2; q) < v, but more buyer types accept trade.
From the above discussion it should be clear, that we do not need to consider
more than two messages at the rst stage: Take any other renegotiation o¤er q00 with
associated message m001. If q
00 > q, a similar proof as the one for Lemma 4 shows that
(; 0; 00) 2 f(0; 1; 1); (1; 1; 1)g and the sellers revenue is as above. If q00 < q the same
argument shows that now (; 0; 00) 2 f(1; 1; 0); (1; 1; 1)g and again the same payo¤s
are achieved, where q00 takes the place of q.
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The seller has three contract choices: He can write no contract and
generate a revenue of (1   F (v))v. He can write a forcing contract and generate a
revenue of (v1; v
). Finally, he can design a contract that splits the rst stage buyer
types into two groups. The eagergroup (V 0 = [vlim1 ; v1]) obtains the good for sure at
the price p0 = (v1; v
)   (v1; q) + (vlim1 ; q). The hesitant group (V = [v1; vlim1 ])
buys the right to buy the good at a price q for an initial fee p = (v1; v
)   (v1; q).
The seller generates the revenue given in (11). In this case he chooses vlim1 and q to
maximize (11), under the constraint that q is a consistent renegotiation o¤er given vlim1 .
6 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed a contracting problem in which information is released se-
quentially over time. We studied two contracting scenarios, the rst with full commit-
ment and the second without commitment. We have shown that with full commitment,
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the contracting solution is a menu of options with di¤erent strike prices that distin-
guishes between every initial informational type. Without commitment the optimal
contract is much coarser. It is either a non-discriminatory contract that either sells to
nobody, or sells to everybody at the same price, or it distinguishes only between low
valuation and high valuation types.
There are some questions that remain open and are interesting for further research.
First, we only considered ex-post renegotiation. Another timing that is interesting to
look at is interim renegotiation. Interim renegotiation could happen either after the
realization of v2 but before messagem2 is sent, or after messagem2 is sent but before the
prescriptions of the contract are carried out. It is important to determine whether the
results we obtained in this paper are sensitive to the timing of renegotiation. Second, we
considered non-stochastic contracts and an extension to  2 [0; 1] should be discussed
in future work.
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7 Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1)
First, we consider the (IC2) constraint. Following a standard argument it can be
replaced by a local rst-order condition with respect to v2 and a monotonicity condition,
that is,
@U(v1; v2; v^2)
@v^2

v^2=v2
= 0
@(v1; v2)
@v2
 0:
The monotonicity condition is neglected in what follows and we check ex-post that
the derived solution satises this condition. Using the local rst-order condition, a
v1 + v2-type buyers utility can be written as
U(v1; v2) = U(v1; v2) +
Z v2
v2
(v1; y) dy. (12)
The utility level U(v1; v2) for each v1 needs to be determined which is done by looking
at (IC1). We show that (IC1) can be replaced by the following two conditions
@ U(v1; v^1)
@v^1

v^1=v1
= 0 (13)
@(v1)
@v1
 0; (14)
where (v1) :=
R v2
v2
(v1; v2) dF2(v2). The rst condition (13) is a local rst-order
condition which is necessary for v^1 = v1 to be the optimal announcement at the rst
stage. It implies that
d U(v1)
dv1
=
@ U(v1; v^1)
@v1

v^1=v1
=
Z v2
v2
(v^1; v^2) dF2(v2)

v^1=v1
=
Z v2
v2
(v1; v2) dF2(v2);
(15)
where the last equality follows because v^2(v1; v2; v1) = v2.
The second condition (14) is a monotonicity condition that replaces the second-
order condition of the buyers maximization problem with respect to v^1. To see that
(14) is necessary, consider two possible types v1 and v^1. For the (ICI) constraint to
hold for both types, we need
U(v1)  U(v1; v^1) = U(v^1) + (v^1)(v1   v^1)
U(v^1)  U(v^1; v1) = U(v1) + (v1)(v^1   v1):
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The two together imply
(v1)(v1   v^1)  (v^1)(v1   v^1);
which implies (14).
For su¢ ciency, assume that (13) and (14) hold but that (IC1) is violated for two
types v1 and v^1. Assume, w.l.o.g., that v1 > v^1. Then,
(v^1)(v1   v^1) > U(v1)  U(v^1);
or equivalently Z v1
v^1
(v^1)dx >
Z v1
v^1
(x)dx;
where the right-hand side follows from (13). But this is in contradiction with (14) since
(v^1)  (x) for all x 2 [v^1; v1]. If v1 < v^1, a similar argument works.
Again we neglect the monotonicity condition and use (15) to obtain
U(v1) = U(v1) +
Z v1
v1
Z v2
v2
(x; v2) dF2(v2)dx: (16)
The lowest rst stage buyer type is optimally kept at his reservation level and therefore
U(v1) = 0. Combining (12) and (16), using U(v1) =
R v2
v2
U(v1; v2) dF2(v2) we obtainZ v1
v1
Z v2
v2
(x; v2) dF2(v2)dx = U(v1; v2) +
Z v2
v2
Z v2
v2
(v1; y) dy dF2(v2);
and by changing order of integration on the left-hand side
U(v1; v2) =
Z v2
v2
"Z v1
v1
(x; v2)dx 
Z v2
v2
(v1; y) dy
#
dF2(v2):
Replacing this expression in (12) we obtain
U(v1; v2) =
Z v2
v2
"Z v1
v1
(x; z) dx 
Z z
v2
(v1; y) dy
#
dF2(z)
+
Z v2
v2
(v1; y) dy:
This expression can be substituted into the sellers objective function in (4) and the
sellers optimization problem becomes
max

Z v1
v1
Z v2
v2
"
(v1; v2)(v1 + v2) 
Z v2
v2
Z v1
v1
(x; z) dx dF2(z)
+
Z v2
v2
Z z
v2
(v1; y) dy dF2(z) 
Z v2
v2
(v1; y) dy
#
dF2(v2) dF1(v1):
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Because the rst term in the second line is independent of v2 the line can be written
equivalently asZ v1
v1
Z v2
v2
Z z
v2
(v1; y) dy dF2(z) dF1(v1) 
Z v1
v1
Z v2
v2
Z v2
v2
(v1; y) dy dF2(v2) dF1(v1);
so it is equal to 0.
The second term in the rst line is also independent of v2 and can therefore be
written as Z v1
v1
Z v2
v2
Z v1
v1
(x; z) dx dF2(z) dF1(v1):
Thus, by changing the order of integration the sellers overall problem can be equiva-
lently written as
max

Z v2
v2
Z v1
v1
"
(v1; v2)(v1 + v2) 
Z v1
v1
(x; v2) dx
#
dF1(v1) dF2(v2):
Using integration by parts for the second part of this expression we obtainZ v1
v1
Z v1
v1
(x; v2) dx dF1(v1) =
Z v1
v1
(x; v2) dx  F1(v1)

v1
v1
 
Z v1
v1
(v1; v2)F1(v1) dv1
=
Z v1
v1
(v1; v2)(1  F1(v1)) dv1:
So the problem becomes:
max

Z v2
v2
Z v1
v1
(v1; v2)

v1 + v2   1  F1(v1)
f1(v1)

dF1(v1) dF2(v2):
Pointwise maximization yields the cut-o¤ rule
(v1; v2) =
8<: 1 if v1 + v2 
1 F1(v1)
f1(v1)
0 otherwise.
:
The probability of trade is monotonically increasing in v2 without any further assump-
tion and so the second order-condition of IC2 is satised. Given the MLRP of F1(),
the probability of trade is also monotonically increasing in v1, which implies that it is
increasing in expectation. So also the second order condition of IC2 is satised. An
initial v1-type buyers expected utility is given by (16):
U(v1) =
Z v1
v1
Z v2
min

v2;
1 F1(x)
f1(x)
 dF2(v2)dx
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Finally, it is easy to see that this allocation can be achieved by the menu of contracts
fA(v1); p(v1)gv12[v1;v1] described in the statement of the proposition. The nal price is
set p(v1) =
1 F1(v1)
f1(v1)
and A(v1) is given by
A(v1) =
Z v2
min

v2;
1 F1(v1)
f1(v1)


v1 + v2   1  F1(v1)
f1(v1)

dF2(v2)  U(v1):
Proof. (Lemma 1)
We rst introduce some notation. Call (m1;m2) the expected probability that
message pair (m1;m2) is sent by the buyer, where expectation is taken over all rst
and second stage buyer types. So,
(m1;m2) =
Z v1
v1
Z v2
v2
1(m1 j v1)2(m2 j v1; v2;m1) dF2(v2) dF1(v1):
Call (m1) the expected probability that message m1 is sent by the buyer, where
expectation is taken over all rst stage buyer types. So,
(m1) =
Z v1
v1
1(m1 j v1) dF1(v1):
The sellers updated beliefs about buyer types v1 and v2 after message pair (m1;m2)
are calculated via Bayes Rule:
F1(v1 j m1;m2) = 1
(m1;m2)
Z v1
v1
Z v2
v2
1(m1 j x)2(m2 j x; v2;m1) dF2(v2) dF1(x);
F2(v2 j m1;m2) = 1
(m1;m2)
Z v1
v1
Z v2
v2
1(m1 j v1)2(m2 j v1; y;m1) dF2(y) dF1(v1):
Similarly, the sellers updated belief about buyer type v1 after message m1 is given by
F1(v1 j m1) = 1
(m1)
Z v1
v1
1(m1 j x) dF1(x):
Finally, the sellers updated belief about the buyers nal buyer type v after the message
pair (m1;m2) is given by
F (v j m1;m2) =
Z v v2
v1
Z v v1
v2
dF2(v2 j m1;m2) dF1(v1 j m1;m2)
and his belief after message m1 is given by
F (v j m1) =
Z v v2
v1
Z v v1
v2
dF2(v2) dF1(v1 j m1):
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We rst show that q = v. Because q is the sellers renegotiation o¤er after every
message pair (m1;m2), we have
(1  F (q j m1;m2))q  (1  F (v j m1;m2))v 8(m1;m2):
Taking expectations over all message pairs (m1;m2) 2M :=M1 M2:Z
M
(1  F (q j m1;m2))q d(m1;m2) 
Z
M
(1  F (v j m1;m2))v d(m1;m2);
which, because of BayesRule, is equivalent to
(1  F (q))q  (1  F (v))v:
Since v is the unique maximizer of (1  F (v))v, this implies q = v.
Next, we show that for any two message pairs (m1;m2) and (m1;m02) in M , except
for a set of message pairs with zero measure, (m1;m2) = (m1;m02) and p(m1;m2) =
p(m1;m
0
2), so the contract does not depend on the second message.
First, we argue that for every message pair (m1;m2) there must exist a nal buyer
type v above v, to which the seller attaches a positive probability after receiving the
message pair (m1;m2). That is, there must exist a rst stage buyer type v1 and a
second stage buyer type v2 with v1 + v2 = v  v, such that F (v j m1;m2) > 0. To see
this, note that if there is no such v  v, the seller obtains an expected payo¤ of 0 by
o¤ering the renegotiation price v. But he obtains a strictly positive expected payo¤
if he chooses a lower renegotiation price and captures some of the nal buyer types
below v.
Second, it is shown that for every message pair (m1;m2), except for a set of messages
with zero measure, there must also exist a nal buyer type v strictly below v, to which
the seller attaches a positive probability after receiving the message pair (m1;m2). That
is, there must exist a rst stage buyer type v1 and a second stage buyer type v2 with
v1 + v2 = v < v
, such that F (v j m1;m2) > 0.
To show this we rst argue that because v maximizes (1  F (v j m1;m2))v for all
message pairs (m1;m2), v must also maximize (1   F (v j m1))v for all m1. For this,
x m1. We have for all m2 and all v:
(1  F (v j m1;m2))v  (1  F (v j m1;m2))v:
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Taking expectations over all messages m2 we have for all vZ
M2
(1  F (v j m1;m2))v d(m2 j m1)

Z
M2
(1  F (v j m1;m2))v d(m2 j m1);
where (m2 j m1) = (m1;m2)=(m1) is the expected probability that m2 is sent at
the second stage given that m1 was sent at the rst stage. Bayes Rule implies that
this is equivalent to
(1  F (v j m1)v  (1  F (v j m1))v:
Now, divide M =M1 M2 into two disjoint subsets M and M: M is dened such
that for all (m1;m2) 2M , the seller, after receiving the message pair (m1;m2), attaches
a positive probability to some nal buyer types below and some nal buyer types above
v. M is dened such that for all (m1;m2) 2M , the seller, after receiving the message
pair (m1;m2), attaches positive probability only to nal buyer types above v, that is,
for all v < v, F (v j m1;m2) = 0. The aim is to show that M has measure 0. Assume
the contrary.
Because v is the sellers optimal renegotiation o¤er after every message pair (m1;m2),
it must be that
v
Z v
v
dF (v j m1;m2)  (v   )
Z v
v 
dF (v j m1;m2) 8(m1;m2) 2M; 8 > 0:
(17)
Using Bayes Rule and the denition of M we can write
1  F (v) =
Z
M
Z v
v
dF (v j m1;m2) d(m1;m2) +
Z
M
Z v
v
dF (v j m1;m2) d(m1;m2)
=
Z
M
d(m1;m2) +
Z
M
Z v
v
dF (v j m1;m2) d(m1;m2):
Given the assumption that M has a positive mass in M , this implies that x :=R
M
R v
v dF (v j m1;m2) d(m1;m2) < 1 F (v). By taking expectation over all (m1;m2)
in M in (17) we obtain
vx  (v   )

x+
Z
M
Z v
v 
dF (v j m1;m2) d(m1;m2)

8 > 0; (18)
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Again, using the denition of M and Bayes Rule we can writeZ
M
Z v
v 
dF (v j m1;m2) d(m1;m2)
=
Z
M
Z v
v 
dF (v j m1;m2) d(m1;m2) +
Z
M
Z v
v 
dF (v j m1;m2) d(m1;m2)
= F (v)  F (v   )
So (18) is equivalent to
vx  (v   ) (x+ F (v)  F (v   )) 8 > 0;
which is equivalent to
x  vG()  (F (v)  F (v   ));
where G() := F (v
) F (v )

: Now, as  approaches 0, this inequality is violated. The
rst part of the right-hand side approaches vf(v), which is, substituting for the
denition of v, equal to 1  F (v), whereas the second part approaches 0. Therefore,
the right-hand side approaches 1  F (v) > x.
Now, x m1 and consider four nal buyer types x, y, x0 and y0 who have all sent
messagem1 at the rst revelation stage.4 Types x and y send messagem2 at the second
revelation stage and are such that x  v < y. Types x0 and y0 send another message
m02 and are such that x
0  v < y0. We consider these four typesincentive constraints.
Type x must prefer message m2 over message m02:
(m1;m2)x  p(m1;m2)  (m1;m02)x  p(m1;m02): (19)
Type y0 must prefer message m02 over message m2:
(m1;m
0
2)y
0   p(m1;m02) + (1  (m1;m02))(y0   v)  (20)
(m1;m2)y
0   p(m1;m2) + (1  (m1;m2))(y0   v):
(19) and (20) together imply the following:
((m1;m2)  (m1;m02))x  ((m1;m2)  (m1;m02))v;
4More precisely, there are rst and second stage buyer types xi, yi, x0i and y
0
i, i = 1; 2, such that
x1 + x2 = x, y1 + y2 = y, x01 + x
0
2 = x
0 and y01 + y
0
2 = y
0 and x1, y1, x01 and y
0
1 have all sent m1.
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that is, (m1;m2)  (m1;m02): The same two inequalities can be written for the
buyer types x0 and y, where the roles of m2 and m02 are reversed, which imply similar
constraints as (19) and (20) and thus
((m1;m2)  (m1;m02))v  ((m1;m2)  (m1;m02))x0:
This implies (m1;m2)  (m1;m02), and therefore (m1;m2) = (m1;m20) and also
p(m1;m2) = p(m1;m
0
2). We consequently simplify notation by suppressing the depen-
dency of (m1;m2); p(m1;m2) and U(m1;m2; v) on m2.
Finally, we show that for any two messages m1 and m01 in M1, (m1) = (m
0
1) and
p(m1) = p(m
0
1), so the contract does not depend on the rst message either.
To see this, we turn to the incentive constraints of a rst stage buyer type who
sends message m1. We compute the expected utility that he receives by sending this
message. A second stage buyer type v  v who has sent message m1 obtains a payo¤
of
(m1)v + (1  (m1))(v   v)  p(m1) = (v   v) + U(m1; v);
A second stage buyer type v < v who has sent message m1 obtains a payo¤ of
(m1)v   p(m1) = (m1)(v   v) + U(m1; v):
Therefore, a rst stage buyer type v1 expects the following payo¤ from message m1:
U(m1; v1) = (m1)
Z v v1
v2
(v1 + v2   v) dF2(v2)
+
Z v2
v v1
(v1 + v2   v) dF2(v2) + U(m1; v)
: = (m1)(v1) + (v1) + U(m1; v
):
Note, that (v1) < 0 and (v1) > 0 and that both are monotonically increasing in v1
and decreasing in v.
Take rst the situation in which two di¤erent rst stage buyer types v01, v1 both
send the two messages m01 and m1 in equilibrium. This implies that
(m01)(v
0
1) + (v
0
1) + U(m
0
1; v
) = (m1)(v01) + (v
0
1) + U(m1; v
);
(m01)(v1) + (v1) + U(m
0
1; v
) = (m1)(v1) + (v1) + U(m1; v);
and consequently that
((m01)  (m1))(v01) = ((m01)  (m1))(v1):
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Because (v01) 6= (v1) if v01 6= v1, this is only possible if (m01) = (m1):
Next, consider the situation in which no two buyer types send the same two messages
m01 and m1. So, there are disjoint sets V (m
0
1); V (m1)  [v1; v1], s.t. all buyer types
in V (m01) send only message m
0
1 and all buyer types in V (m1) send only message m1.
Then, either (m01) = (m1) or V (m
0
1) and V (m1) must be connected. Assume for
example that V (m01) is not connected. Then there must exist three types v
0
1 < v1 < v
00
1
with v01; v
00
1 2 V (m01) and v1 2 V (m1): The incentive constraints of v01 and v1 yield
((m01)  (m1))(v01)  ((m01)  (m1))(v1)
and (m01)  (m1). The incentive constraints of types v1 and v001 together imply that
((m01)  (m1))(v001)  ((m01)  (m1))(v1);
which is only satised if (m01)  (m1): Therefore, (m01) = (m1) if V (m01) is not
connected.
Finally, consider the situation in which V (m01) and V (m1) are two disjoint intervals
with V (m01) belowV (m1). But then it is impossible that v
 simultaneously maximizes
(1   F (v j m01))v and (1   F (v j m1))v. The v that maximizes (1   F (v j m01))v
should in fact lie strictly below the one that maximizes (1   F (v j m1))v. Therefore,
the fact that V (m01) and V (m1) are two disjoint intervals is inconsistent with our
initial assumption that the renegotiation o¤er is the same after every message. This
proves that (m01) = (m1) from which it follows that U(m
0
1; v
) = U(m1; v) and also
p(m01) = p(m1).
Proof. Lemma 2
Fix m1: Consider q and q^, dened as in the statement of the Lemma, and any of the
higher renegotiation prices qi > q^. We consider ve possible messages at the second
revelation stage: m2, m02, which both lead to renegotiation price q, m^2, m^
0
2, which both
lead to q^, and mi2, which leads to qi. This is without loss of generality, because the
naming of messages is arbitrary. Following an identical argument as in the proof of
Lemma 2 one can show that there must exist nal buyer types v; v0  q, such that
v sends m2 and v0 sends m02 with positive probability in equilibrium. Similarly, there
must exist nal buyer types v^; v^0  q^, such that v^ sends m^2 and v^0 sends m^02 with
positive probability in equilibrium. Finally, there must exist a nal buyer type vi  qi,
such that vi sends mi2 with positive probability in equilibrium
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Next, we want to show that we can nd v; v0, such that q^ > v; v0. Assume to the
contrary that all nal buyer types that send message m2 or m02 either lie strictly below
q or above q^. But then, instead of setting the renegotiation price q after message m2 or
m02 the seller can set a renegotiation price at or above q^. This raises his payo¤ because
he obtains a higher price from the buyer types with whom he trades and he does not
loose any buyer types by charging the higher price.
We now use the incentive constraints of the buyer types v, v0, v^, v^0 and vi to
formulate restrictions on the contract. To simplify notation, we set (m1;m2) = ,
(m1;m
0
2) = 
0, (m1; m^2) = ^, (m1; m^02) = ^
0
and (m1;mi2) = 
i. Dene p; p0; p^,
p^0 and pi similarly.
For v to be sending message m2 rather than m^2 and for v^ to be sending message
m^2 rather than m2 it must be that
v + (1  )(v   q)  p  ^v   p^;
^v^ + (1  ^))(v^   q^)  p^  v^ + (1  )(v^   q)  p;
which together imply
(1  ^)v   (1  )q  p  p^  (1  ^)q^   (1  )q:
So, ^ = 1 and p^ = p + (1   )q. Using v and v^0s incentive constraints, the same
argument shows that also ^
0
= 1 and p^0 = p+ (1  )q. Similarly, v and vis incentive
constraints together imply i = 1 and pi = p + (1   )q. Finally, using the incentive
constraints of v and v0, one can show that p+ (1  )q = p0 + (1  0)q.
Summarizing, the contract prescribes the same outcome after the message pairs
(m1; m^2), (m1; m^02) and (m1;m
i
2). Therefore, both messages m^
0
2 and m
i
2 can be deleted.
Since qi was chosen arbitrarily, this also implies that any other message leading to
a di¤erent renegotiation price qj can be deleted. In what follows we therefore only
consider the remaining three messages m2, m02 and m^2 and the two renegotiation prices
q and q^.
Take any nal buyer type v  q. This buyer type obtains the same payo¤ whether
he sends message m2, m02 or m^2:
m2 m
0
2 m^2
v   (1  )q   p v   (1  0)q   p0 v   p^:
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Also, the seller obtains the same payo¤from this buyer type regardless of which message
the latter sends:
m2 m
0
2 m^2
p(1  )q p0 + (1  0)q p^:
Take any nal buyer type v < q. This buyer type obtains the following payo¤s
depending on the message he sends
m2 m
0
2 m^2
v   p 0v   p0 v   p^
From the expressions for p^ and p it follows that this buyer type gets a lower payo¤ from
sending m^2 than from sending either m2 or m02. Furthermore, he sends m2 if and only
if   0. Because the naming of messages is arbitrary, we can assume without loss of
generality that   0. Therefore, the message pair (m1;m02) generates the same nal
payo¤s as the message pair (m1;m2) for the seller and for every buyer type that sends
it with positive probability in equilibrium, and m02 can consequently be deleted.
This leaves us with messages m2 and m^2 and the following ex-post utility levels.
Any buyer type v  q receives a payo¤ of
v   p  (1  )q;
Any nal buyer type v < q receives a payo¤ of
v   p:
Proof. Lemma 3
First, assume that there are two rst stage buyer types v1 6= v01 who both send
messages m1 and m01. It will be shown that then  = 
0 = 1. Both types must be
indi¤erent between sending either message and therefore
(1  )(v01; q)  (1  0)(v01; q0) = p0   p = (1  )(v1; q)  (1  0)(v1; q0)
Therefore, the constraint is
((v1; q) (v01; q))+(v01; q) (v01; q0) = 0((v1; q0) (v01; q0))+(v1; q) (v1; q0):
(21)
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Note, that
(v1; q) =
v2Z
v2
min(v1 + v2; q) dF2(v2)
=
q v1Z
v2
v1 + v2 dF2(v2) +
v2Z
q v1
q dF2(v2)
= qF2(q   v1) 
q v1Z
v2
F2(v2)dv2 + q(1  F2(q   v1))
= q  
q v1Z
v2
F2(v2)dv2
With this we obtain for (21)

0B@ q v
0
1Z
q v1
F2(v2) dv2
1CA+q q0+ q
0 v01Z
q v01
F2(v2) dv2 = 
0
0B@ q
0 v01Z
q0 v1
F2(v2) dv2
1CA+q q0+ q
0 v1Z
q v1
F2(v2) dv2
and so
 (1  )
Z q v01
q v1
F2(v2) dv2 =  (1  0)
Z q0 v01
q0 v1
F2(v2) dv2 (22)
Because F2() is strictly increasing, it follows that
R q v01
q v1 F2(v2) dv2 6=
R q0 v01
q0 v1 F2(v2) dv2
for q 6= q0 and v1 6= v01 and therefore  = 0 = 1.
Next, assume that there are two disjoint subsets V and V 0 of rst stage buyer types
who send messages m1 and m01 respectively. We want to show that unless V and V
0
are two connected intervals,  = 0 = 1. Assume w.l.o.g. that V = [v1; v
1
1] [ [v21; v1]
and V 0 = [v11; v
2
1] and that V 6= ? and that V 0 6= ?, so that v11 6= v21. Then, the two
types v11 and v
2
1 must be indi¤erent between sending messages m1 andm
0
1 and the same
argument as above with can be applied to show that  = 0 = 1.
Finally, it is possible that V and V 0 are two connected, disjoint intervals. Without
loss of generality: V = [v1; v
lim
1 ] and V
0 = [vlim1 ; v1]. Therefore, the incentive constraint
of a rst stage buyer type v1 2 V together with the incentive constraint of a type
v01 2 V 0 imply that
(1  )(v01; q)  (1  0)(v01; q0)  p0   p  (1  )(v1; q)  (1  0)(v1; q0)
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So,
 (1  )
Z q v01
q v1
F2(v2) dv2   (1  0)
Z q0 v01
q0 v1
F2(v2) dv2
Or, since v1 < v01,
(1  )
Z q v1
q v01
F2(v2) dv2  (1  0)
Z q0 v1
q0 v01
F2(v2) dv2:
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